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LIMITATIONS ON MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
IN SECOND COLLISION ACTIONS
Robert C. Reichert
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of tort law is one of courts creating new causes of
action. Never are the courts praised more than when a complaint
alleging a novel harm is held to state a cause of action. Witness the
applauded growth of strict liability for defective products. In con-
trast, courts act more slowly to recognize, or create, appropriate
defenses in these new actions. California was the first state to
adopt strict liability in products liability in 1963;1 California
adopted the defense of comparative fault 15 years later.2 In strict
liability, defenses based on a plaintiff's lack of reasonable care
were slow to develop because manufacturer liability was "strict,"
not based on a lack of reasonable care in the product's manufac-
ture. Any defense to manufacturer liability that required a jury to
compare the negligent conduct of a plaintiff with the strict liability
of a manufacturer appeared, for over a decade in California, to be a
misapplication of strict liability principles. The apparent reluc-
tance of the courts to recognize defenses based on a plaintiffs lack
of reasonable care in strict liability claims is nowhere more evident
than in second collision cases.8
In 1968 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a manu-
facturer is liable to the occupants of a motor vehicle for injuries
enhanced by a defectively designed component (second collision),
even though the defective design did not cause the initial vehicle
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
2. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
3. "Second collision," also known as "second impact" refers to the impact of a vehicle
occupant with the interior of his vehicle when it suddenly stops or changes direction. Be-
cause the occupant is not rigidly attached to the vehicle, the occupant suffers harm a frac-
tion of a sicond after the initial impact of the exterior of his vehicle with an obstruction.
For example, when an automobile strikes a tree, the vehicle receives instantaneous exterior
damage (first collision) followed a millisecond later by the driver's body striking the steering
wheel (second collision).
This note is not intended to be an introduction to second collision liability; rather, it
assumes a limited degree of familiarity with products liability in general, and second colli-
sion liability in particular. For background information on this issue the reader is referred
to W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIAfILrrY § 253 (1979) [hereinafter cited as KIMBLE],
and Foland, Enhanced Injury-Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crash-
worthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600 (1977).
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accident (first collision).' By the late 1970s the vast majority of
courts5 recognized a plaintiff's right to recover for second collision
enhanced injuries. However, no consensus exists concerning the
conduct of a plaintiff that may limit manufacturer liability.'
The purpose of this comment is to determine what conduct of
a plaintiff, if any, should limit manufacturer liability in second col-
lision claims. The current lack of consensus concerning plaintiff
conduct is a consequence of the courts' failure to understand the
basis of manufacturer liability for second collision injuries. There-
fore, this comment will first analyze the nature of second collision
injuries and the basis of manufacturer liability. Next, the elements
of a prima facie claim for second collision injuries are examined.
Finally, this comment considers the limitations on manufacturer
liability that follow from the suggested analysis.
II. JUDICIAL HISTORY
In Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,7 the Eighth Circuit recog-
nized a manufacturer's duty to use reasonable care in the design of
its vehicle to protect a user from an unreasonable risk of injury in
a collision. The statement of liability articulated in Larsen is the
foundation of manufacturer liability in second collision.
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufac-
turer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury
caused by the defective design over and above the damage or in-
jury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact
or collision absent the defective design.8
In 1973 Montana adopted the Larsen rule in Brandenburger v.
Toyota Motors Sales.' Plaintiff Brandenburger was a passenger in
a Toyota Land Cruiser that crashed and rolled because of the neg-
4. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). See Annot., 42
A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
5. One commentator has counted 30 jurisdictions, including Montana, that have
adopted a rule similar to the Larsen rule, and nine jurisdictions that have refused to apply
the Larsen rule. Golden, Automobile Crashworthiness - The Judiciary Responds When
Manufacturers Improperly Design Their Cars, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 335 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Elli Thorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973) (only as-
sumption of risk is a defense in second collision). But see Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (all aspects of the plaintiff's conduct
that may have contributed to the vehicle crash or plaintiff's injuries may be considered by
the jury in apportioning fault); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Co., 506 F. Supp.
1093 (D. Mont. 1981) (all of plaintiff's conduct is compared with defendant's liability).
7. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
8. Id. at 503.
9. 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973).
[Vol. 43
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ligence of Oltz, the driver. When the vehicle rolled, the top came
off; both occupants were thrown from the vehicle. The vehicle
rolled over Brandenburger but not Oltz. Neither occupant was
wearing the manufacturer-installed seat belts.10 Brandenburger's
counsel successfully argued for the adoption of both second colli-
sion liability as stated in Larsen and strict liability." Toyota
raised no defenses based on Brandenburger's conduct.
Two years later the Montana Supreme Court again addressed
second collision liability in Oltz v. Toyota Motor Sales."" Oltz is
the second collision action brought by the driver of the vehicle in
which Brandenburger was riding. Oltz sued Toyota for alleged sec-
ond collision enhanced injuries. The court held that the negli-
gence of Oltz (established by the trial court and affirmed in
Brandenburger) in causing the crash prevented any recovery from
Toyota:
[W]here, as here, in a strict liability case involving an alleged
manufacturing defect that was unknown to the operator and
which had nothing to do with causing the accident in question,
but merely contributed to the operators injuries, his own contrib-
utory negligence in the operation of the vehicle so as to cause it to
leave the highway is a proper defense.15
The only other reported decision in Montana dealing with sec-
ond collision is the 1981 case Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Air-
craft Co.,'4 decided by United States District Judge Hatfield.
Trust Corp., is a ruling on the kinds of second collision defenses
permissible in a trial on the merits. Marlin Wagner, represented by
Trust Corporation of Montana, piloted a small plane that at-
tempted to take-off while overloaded and in air that was too hot to
provide sufficient lift. Wagner died from injuries received in the
crash. Trust Corporation argued that Wagner's death resulted
from enhanced injuries caused by the manufacturer's, Piper's, fail-
ure to install shoulder harness restraints. 5 Piper countered that
10. Id. at 508-09, 513 P.2d at 270.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides in relevant part:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
12. 166 Mont. 217, 531 P.2d 1341 (1975).
13. Id. at 220, 531 P.2d at 1343.
14. 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
15. Id. at 1094.
1982]
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Wagner's conduct amounted to assumption of risk, contributory
negligence and misuse.1 6 Judge Hatfield ruled that the plaintiff
cannot be excused from the reasonable operation of his aircraft
and, therefore, that the conduct of Wagner (although not labeled
assumption of risk, contributory negligence or misuse) could be
considered by the jury using pure comparative fault to apportion
liability for damages.
1 7
Montana courts have twice addressed the issue of manufac-
turer defenses in second collision cases. In both Oltz and Trust
Corp., the courts allowed a comparison between the accident-pro-
ducing fault of the plaintiffs (negligent driving, negligent flying)
and the manufacturers' liability for the injuries allegedly enhanced
because of a defective design (poor roof design, failure to equip the
airplane with a shoulder harness). In determining a manufacturer's
liability for second collision injuries, is it proper to mitigate liabil-
ity on the basis of a plaintiff's conduct? The following analysis of
manufacturer liability for second collision injuries provides the
answer.
III. ANALYSIS OF SECOND COLLISION LIABILITY
A. The Basis for Second Collision Liability
The Larsen decision recognizes the injustice of allowing a
manufacturer to escape liability for a defectively designed compo-
nent that causes injury over and above that which would have oc-
curred if the component had been properly designed. For example,
if the driver of an automobile dies in a 15 mph collision because
his head strikes protruding, arrowhead-shaped control knobs, then
regardless of the accident-causing fault of the driver, the manufac-
turer is, to some degree, responsible for the driver's death in what
should have been a survivable crash. No one can claim in the above
hypothetical accident that the manufacturer should be liable in
second collision for the property damage to the exterior of the ve-
hicle. Nor should the manufacturer be liable if, altering the hypo-
thetical, the plaintiff's car collides with a bridge abutment at 130
mph. Control knobs as soft as marshmallows would be as "danger-
ous" to the plaintiff as arrowhead-shaped control knobs at 130
mph; death could not have been avoided by changing the shape or
composition of the control knobs.
Against the background of these hypothetical accidents, the
reason for imposing manufacturer liability for second collision in-
16. Id. at 1095.
17. Id. at 1098-99.
[Vol. 43
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juries emerges: but for a manufacturer's failure to use a practical,
alternative design, the plaintiff would have suffered less extensive
injuries. The axiom, or starting point, of second collisiond liability
as established in Larsen may be stated as follows: a manufacturer
is only liable for that portion of a plaintiff's injury enhanced by a
defective design.18
Two additional concepts complete the analytic framework for
second collision liability; they are accident-causing fault and in-
jury-enhancing fault."9 Accident-causing fault refers to liability
apportioned on the basis of contribution to the proximate cause of
the first collision. For example, when a plaintiff deliberately drives
his car into a tree, the accident-causing fault lies wholly with the
plaintiff; when a plaintiff is involved in a two car collision and a
jury determines the plaintiff is 30 percent negligent and the defen-
dant is 70 percent negligent, the jury apportions liability on the
basis of the proximate cause of the first collision. Injury-enhancing
fault refers to liability apportioned on the basis of contribution to
the proximate cause of the second collision enhanced injuries. For
example, when a plaintiff is injured in a 15 mph crash because his
shoulder harness fails, allowing the plaintiff's head to strike the
steering wheel in what would otherwise have been an injury-free
collision, the manufacturer of the defective harness has injury-en-
hancing fault for the injuries caused by the harness failure.
In every second collision case there are two kinds of proximate
cause: the proximate cause of the first collision (associated with
accident-causing fault) and the proximate cause of second collision
enhanced injuries (associated with injury-enhancing fault). Just as
a plaintiff and a vehicle-driving defendant may both cause a first
collision, so too may a manufacturer and a plaintiff both causally
contribute to second collision enhanced injuries.2 0
B. Elements of a Second Collision Cause of Action
The elements of a plaintiff's prima facie second collision case
are similar to any strict liability action; the major difference is the
18. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
19. Judge Hatfield briefly refers to "accident-causing fault" and "injury-causing fault"
in Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Co., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D. Mont. 1981).
See also Galerstein, A Review of Crashworthiness, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 187, 210 (1979). This
writer prefers "injury-enhancing fault" to "injury-causing fault" because it more clearly
limits the question of liability to enhanced injuries. "Injury-causing fault" obscures the fact
that a vehicle-driving defendant, or an accident-causing plaintiff are liable for all non-en-
hanced injuries on the basis of contribution to the proximate cause of the first collision.
Accident-causing fault, then, is synonymous with non-enhanced injury-causing fault.
20. See Part IV, § B infra for a discussion of a plaintiff's injury-enhancing fault.
1982] 113
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problem of proof of defective design.21 Proving defective design is
more difficult in second collision cases than the usual products lia-
bility casp because a manufacturer's liability is limited to enhanced
injuries. In second collision cases, a defective design is the cause of
enhanced injuries; absent enhanced injuries there is no design de-
fect. Therefore, proof of enhanced injuries implies the existence of
a defect and a causal relationship between the defect and en-
hanced injuries.
Because "enhanced" is a relative term, a plaintiff must com-
pare his injuries allegedly caused by a defective design with the
injuries he probably would have suffered had the manufacturer
used an equally feasible design. Only those injuries that are greater
than the injuries that would have resulted had a proper design
been used are compensable as enhanced injuries.
22
The basis of comparison for determining the existence of en-
hanced injuries is established when a plaintiff proves:28 (1) the ex-
istence of an alternative design practicable under the circum-
stances that could have been used by the manufacturer and (2) the
extent of the injuries that would probably have been caused by the
alternative design had it been used. In order to prove what part of
the second collision injuries are enhanced injuries a plaintiff must
show: 24 (3) the extent of the injuries caused by the design used by
the manufacturer. By "subtracting" the extent of the injuries that
would have been caused by the alternative design (2) from the ex-
tent of the injuries caused by the actual design (3), a plaintiff
proves the existence and measure of enhanced injuries. That is, if
the injuries of (3) are greater than the injuries of (2) then these
injuries are enhanced injuries. If there are enhanced injuries, then
the design was defective. Because proof of enhanced injuries re-
quires a plaintiff to prove which injuries were caused by the design
used and also the injuries that would have been caused by the al-
ternative design, proof of (1), (2) and (3) establishes that the de-
fective design was a proximate cause of the enhanced injuries. But
for the defective design the enhanced injuries would not have
occurred.
When a plaintiff dies of injuries suffered in the second colli-
21. A second collision action may also be based on a production defect (improper man-
ufacture) as well as design defect. The suggested analysis applies with minor changes to
production defects. For example, a plaintiff need not prove the existence of an alternative
design (see text accompanying note 23 infra) but must prove the product in question was
not made in accordance with manufacturer specifications.
22. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
23. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3rd Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 738.
114 [Vol. 43
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sion an additional element of proof is required. His representative
must show:25 (4) the second collision injuries were survivable but
for the alleged defective design. To show (4) a plaintiff proves that
the design defect was the sole cause of death, or that the non-en-
hanced injuries did not cause death. Non-enhanced injuries are the
total of all injuries a plaintiff would have received in the second
collision had the alternative design been used.20 This additional re-
quirement of "survivability"2" is necessary to avoid manufacturer
liability for a death that could not have been prevented by use of
an alternative design. For example, a plaintiff dies when his ar-
rowhead control knob equipped automobile collides with a bridge
abutment at 130 mph. No design change could have prevented the
plaintiff's death in an unsurvivable 130 mph crash. To hold a man-
ufacturer liable for death caused by non-enhanced injuries makes
the manufacturer an insurer because no action by the manufac-
turer could have prevented death.
One consequence of requiring a plaintiff to show enhanced in-
juries is that when injuries are not capable of apportionment into
those caused by a defect and those injuries not caused by a defect,
a manufacturer is free from liability. The axiom from which second
collision liability is derived limits manufacturer liability to en-
hanced injuries; if the injuries suffered by a plaintiff cannot be
identified as caused by an alleged design defect they cannot, by
definition, be injuries enhanced by an alleged defect. The opposite
argument-that there are enhanced injuries, but a plaintiff cannot
prove them-arises from "cart-before-the-horse" logic; the exis-
tence and magnitude of an alleged enhanced injury cannot be de-
termined until a plaintiff provides a nonspeculative means to iden-
tify injuries caused by an alleged design defect.
C. Burden of Proof
The key element of manufacturer liability is proof of enhanced
injuries. Which party has the burden of proving enhanced injuries?
Applying traditional legal principles, the party that initiated the
complaint and stands to benefit from the proof-the plaintiff-has
25. Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Co., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
"[The] plaintiff must first prove the crash was survivable [but for the alleged defect] .
Id. at 1094.
26. Liability for non-enhanced injuries is based on accident-causing fault.
27. "Survivability" is determined independent of accident-causing fault and injury-
enhancing fault. It is irrelevant to a determination of survivability who or what caused the
first and second collision; the question of survivability is a factual one, to be inferred from
actual and probable non-enhanced injuries, and is in no way related to fault.
1982]
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the burden.2" In all strict liability actions it is the plaintiff's bur-
den to prove the defective design; in second collision cases, the
plaintiff proves defective design by establishing the existence and
magnitude of enhanced injuries.
One commentator has suggested that manufacturers should
carry the burden of establishing the lack or measure of enhanced
injuries.2 9 The consequences of placing this burden on a manufac-
turer make this approach unacceptable. It would greatly encourage
litigation because every injury suffered in an automobile accident
is a second collision injury. Therefore, this cause of action is avail-
able to every plaintiff. A plaintiff would have nothing to lose, and
everything to gain, by joining a manufacturer as a defendant in
every case. This would increase the nuisance value of second colli-
sion claims because manufacturers would bear the risk of failing to
carry the burden. To escape liability, a manufacturer would have
to bear the costs of accident reconstruction and medical testimony.
The cost of this indirect insurance system for plaintiffs would be
passed on to consumers of the manufactured product.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
A. Rebuttal of Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
A manufacturer can begin the attempt to limit liability by
clarifying the circumstances under which it should be held liable.
Because second collision actions are rare in most jurisdictions,
courts must be educated concerning each element of a plaintiff's
case. Armed with an understanding of the key concepts of second
collision liability, a manufacturer should be able to convince a
court to adopt the proof requirements of design defect, enhanced
injury and causation suggested above in Part III. Once a court has
determined the extent of a plaintiff's burden, a manufacturer may
challenge each element of a plaintiff's prima facie case.
B. Defenses to Liability
1. Introduction
In determining the extent of a manufacturer's liability for en-
hanced injuries, should the trier of fact be allowed to consider
28. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 38 (4th ed. 1971). "The burden of proof... is quite
uniformly upon the plaintiff, since he is asking the court for relief, and must lose if his case
does not outweigh that of his adversary." Id. at 208-09.
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every aspect of a plaintiff's conduct? Because the question ignores
the distinction between accident-causing fault and injury-enhanc-
ing fault, it has no single correct answer. Assume a plaintiff discon-
nects the device that activates a manufacturer-installed airbag and
is later injured when he strikes a defectively designed steering
wheel. In this situation the trier of fact should be allowed to con-
sider the plaintiff's conduct because he took affirmative action to
increase his risk of harm. However, if all of a plaintiff's conduct is
considered, how could liability be apportioned between a plaintiff
and a manufacturer when a plaintiff is 100 percent at fault in caus-
ing the first collision? An application of the concepts and distinc-
tions developed in the preceding sections of this note demonstrate
that while accident-causing fault cannot be compared with injury-
enhancing fault, a plaintiff's injury-enhancing fault should be com-
pared with a manufacturer's injury-enhancing fault.
2. Accident-causing Fault Cannot be Compared with Injury-en-
hancing Fault
Accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault must be
clearly distinguished in second collision actions. Because accident-
causing fault and injury-enhancing fault are related to two differ-
ent proximate causes (first and second collisions) of two different
harms (non-enhanced and enhanced injuries), these two faults
must be kept separate in any analysis of second collision claims.
The following argument demonstrates that the two faults cannot
be compared without contradicting the axiom on which second col-
lision liability is based.3 0
Assume the accident-causing fault of a plaintiff and the in-
jury-enhancing fault of a manufacturer are compared equally. The
only possible way accident-causing fault may be "compared" with
injury-enhancing fault is by treating accident-causing fault as a
prior cause of sufficient magnitude to relieve the manufacturer of
liability; in other words, by treating the accident-causing fault of a
plaintiff as an intervening superseding causes of his enhanced in-
juries. A comparison of a plaintiff's accident-causing fault with a
manufacturer's injury-enhancing fault is not, as it may first ap-
30. The argument is of the form reductio ad absurdum, that is, a premise is assumed
to be true and from this premise a contradiction of a known truth is derived. The contradic-
tion logically implies the falsity of the assumed premise.
31. For a discussion of the defense of superseding cause to a plaintiff's prima facie
case in a products liability action, see Rost v. C. F. & I. Steel Corp., - Mont. -, 616
P.2d 383 (1980) and Survey, Montana Supreme Court Survey of 1980 Tort Decisions, 42
MONT. L. REV. 423, 435 (1981). See also KIMBLE, supra note 3, at § 252.
1982]
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pear, an affirmative defense. It is an attack on the element of cau-
sation in a plaintiff's prima facie case, an attack claiming a defect
did not cause the plaintiff's injuries; simply, the accident-causing
fault of the plaintiff caused all of his injuries. Consideration of a
plaintiff's accident-causing fault is not an affirmative defense be-
cause an affirmative defense grants the plaintiff a prima facie
case.32 Once accident-causing fault comparison is recognized as the
defense of superseding cause, the limitation imposed by consider-
ing only a plaintiff's accident-causing fault is seen as highly artifi-
cial. Whenever superseding cause is raised as a defense it is raised
without regard to the status of the person contributing the super-
seding cause as a plaintiff, a co-defendant or a non-party. 3 There-
fore, whenever accident-causing fault is considered in mitigation of
second collision liability, consideration must not be limited solely
to a plaintiff's accident-causing fault.
But by definition, a manufacturer in a second collision action
has zero percent accident-causing fault, so there is always 100 per-
cent accident-causing fault to be considered in mitigation of a
manufacturer's injury-enhancing fault. One hundred percent acci-
dent-causing fault compared with a manufacturer's injury-enhanc-
ing fault will always constitute a superseding cause of enhanced
injuries, thereby insulating a manufacturer from liability in every
second collision action and contradicting the holding in Larsen and
the axiom.
When second collision claims were first raised, a defense of su-
perseding cause based on the causation of the first collision was
often successfully raised.3 4 Larsen established a new precedent by
holding that a manufacturer would be liable for enhanced injuries
even though the design defect did not cause the first collision. Im-
plicit in this holding is the rule stated above: accident-causing
fault cannot be compared with injury-enhancing fault.
Trust Corp. illustrates the contradiction in treating accident-
causing fault as a superseding cause. The facts that gave rise to
Trust Corp. suggest that the plaintiff was 100 percent at accident-
causing fault. That is, absent the plaintiff's alleged negligence the
crash would not have occurred.
32. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (5th ed. 1979).
33. See note 31 supra.
34. See, e.g., Tamburello v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 206 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. La. 1962);
Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So.2d 568 (Miss. 1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So.
2d 797 (Miss. 1970). But see Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir.
1968).
35. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
[Vol. 43118
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Under the facts alleged, the accident-causing fault of the [plain-
tiff] and the injury-causing defects of the manufacturer are to be
compared equally. Both manufacturer Piper and [plaintiff] Wag-
ner should be held responsible when, but for the action of both,
injury would have been less or none at all."s
Clearly, the plaintiff's 100 percent accident-causing fault is treated
as a superseding cause relieving the manufacturer of liability.
Nevertheless, can one infer from the holding in Trust Corp.
that if another person, a pilot of another plane, caused the crash
that the plaintiff could recover from the manufacturer? Or, equiv-
alently, is the accident-causing fault of a third party irrelevant to
manufacturer liability for the plaintiff's alleged enhanced injuries?
No, logical consistency, policy and precedent require that if a
plaintiff's accident-causing fault is compared with a manufac-
turer's injury-enhancing fault, all other "contributors" to the acci-
dent-causing fault must be considered. First, from the perspective
of the manufacturer who asserts the superseding cause defense, it
makes no difference who created the superseding cause. There is
no cause of action that limits a defense of superseding cause to a
plaintiff's conduct. Second, no good reason exists for limiting the
effectiveness of strict liability in encouraging manufacturers to
make safe products to only those instances in which a third party
causes the accident, when one considers that the alleged defect is
never causally related to the first collision. Third, if a plaintiff's
accident-causing fault is 30 percent, a manufacturer's liability is,
presumably, reduced proportionally-a proportion dependent on
causal contributions to the first collision and wholly without rela-
tion to the proximate cause of the enhanced injuries. Thus, once a
court acknowledges second collision liability for enhanced injuries,
the chain of events that caused the first collision must be disre-
garded in determining liability for second injuries.
The mistake of comparing a plaintiff's accident-causing fault
with a manufacturer's injury-enhancing fault is made for numerous
reasons, primarily because of a failure to distinguish between acci-
dent-causing fault (proximate cause of the first collision and non-
enhanced injuries) and injury-enhancing fault (proximate cause of
second collision enhanced injuries). A plaintiff assumes responsibil-
ity for whatever portion of his injuries is attributable to his own
conduct, namely, the non-enhanced injuries attributable to his ac-
cident-causing fault and the enhanced injuries attributable to his
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injury-enhancing fault. Secondly, it may not be recognized that the
uniqueness of second collision claims place these actions outside
the current trend toward comparison of all a plaintiff's conduct
with a manufacturer's strict liability.-7 Third, a comparison of acci-
dent-causing fault with injury-enhancing fault may be motivated
by the erroneous belief that if a plaintiff's accident-causing fault is
not considered to reduce a manufacturer's liability, the plaintiff
would receive a windfall and the manufacturer would be a virtual
insurer. This "belief" overlooks a sound manufacturer defense:
comparison of a plaintiff's injury-enhancing fault with a manufac-
turer's injury-enhancing fault.
3. Comparison of Injury-enhancing Faults
Liability for enhanced injury is apportioned on the basis of
contribution to the proximate cause of the enhanced injuries. This
apportionment is done by a jury when it compares the injury-en-
hancing fault of a manufacturer with the injury-enhancing fault of
a plaintiff. A manufacturer has injury-enhancing fault when a
plaintiff has proved the existence and magnitude of enhanced inju-
ries. A plaintiff has injury-enhancing fault when he fails to conduct
himself in a reasonable manner to avoid unnecessary injury in the
event of a collision, that is, when a plaintiff's action or inaction is a
contributing proximate cause of his enhanced injuries. Because a
plaintiff's claim against a manufacturer is for enhanced injuries
and not for all a plaintiff's harm, under the suggested analysis, the
conduct of a plaintiff in enhancing his own injuries must be taken
into consideration.
4. Traditional Defenses
Conduct of a plaintiff contributing to his injury-enhancing
fault (not accident-causing fault) may be labeled contributory neg-
ligence. Perhaps the best example of contributorily negligent in-
jury-enhancing conduct is the failure to use a seat belt in a situa-
tion where a reasonable person would have used one. Contributory
negligence implies a duty not met; the duty of reasonable care to
avoid second collision injury is analogous to the duty to use reason-
able care to avoid a first collision. Just as the courts have recog-
nized a manufacturer's duty to society to produce safe products,
the courts should recognize that if a plaintiff sues for enhanced
injuries his duty to avoid unnecessary injury should be considered
37. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
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to mitigate a manufacturer's liability. Failure to recognize this
duty in a suit for enhanced injuries is equivalent to ignoring a
plaintiff's injury-enhancing fault.
Why should a plaintiff have a duty to protect himself from
injury in a suit against a manufacturer, but not in a suit against a
vehicle-driving defendant? A plaintiff's injury-enhancing fault is
irrelevant in a claim against a vehicle-driving defendant because
that claim is litigated on the basis of proximate cause of the first
collision (accident-causing fault) and is not concerned with en-
hanced injuries. Only in a second collision claim where the injury-
enhancing fault of a manufacturer is at issue is the injury-enhanc-
ing fault of a plaintiff considered.
Assumption of risk can be a defense to second collision liabil-
ity, but its use would be infrequent. Within the context of a second
collision claim, assumption of risk must be with respect to injury-
enhancing fault and not accident-causing fault. Because assump-
tion of risk requires a subjective awareness of the risk38 (in this
case, of a defective design) a plaintiff must know of the possibility
of enhanced injuries from a defective design and proceed unrea-
sonably in the face of that risk. While it is conceivable that a
plaintiff's conduct might qualify as assumption of risk, it is not
clear that a distinction needs to be made between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence.
A defense often raised in second collision cases is misuse of
the vehicle. According to the above analysis, misuse that leads to
the first collision, or accident-causing fault, is irrelevant. However,
misuse that affects the reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct to
protect himself from second collision injury is a defense because it
is injury-enhancing fault.3 9 Misuse that is injury-enhancing fault is
best dealt with by allowing a jury to consider all the plaintiff's in-
jury-enhancing conduct and not by giving each aspect of injury-
enhancing fault a separate name. The analytic artillary necessary
to distinguish between accident-causing misuse and injury-enhanc-
ing misuse is a potential source of confusion to a jury.
38. Brown v. North American Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 110-11, 576 P.2d 711, 719
(1978).
39. For example, injury-enhancing misuse might include using a single seat belt for
two persons. Misuse of a vehicle in causing the first collision (accident-causing fault) may be
relevant to the reasonableness of a plaintiff's care to protect himself from unnecessary harm.
For example, reasonable care required of a driver who hill-climbs in a Honda Civic might
include installation of a roll cage and an automatic fire extinguishing system.
19821
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5. Comparative Fault
The traditional defenses-contributory negligence, assumption
of risk, misuse-describe circumstances created by a plaintiff that
contribute to the proximate cause of the enhanced injuries. Con-
ceptual parsimony suggests that all the circumstances of a plain-
tiff's injury-enhancing fault be considered as a single factor in de-
termining a plaintiff's causal contribution to the enhanced injuries.
The term "comparative fault" is well suited to replace the tradi-
tional defenses in strict liability actions. Comparative fault de-
scribes the balancing of the injury-enhancing fault between a
plaintiff and manufacturer, irrespective of whether the injury-en-
hancing fault of a plaintiff is contributory negligence, assumption
of risk or misuse.40
The semantic change to comparative fault is desirable if only
to avoid the spurious negligence versus strict liability argument41
that frequently appears whenever manufacturer defenses are raised
in products liability. The term comparative fault emphasizes the
distinction between the issue of comparative negligence of a plain-
tiff with respect to a vehicle-driving defendant, and the issue of
the comparative fault of a plaintiff and a manufacturer regarding
injury-enhancing fault.
6. Instruction Referring to Plaintiff's Injury-enhancing Fault
By allowing consideration of a plaintiff's injury-enhancing
fault, each party is liable only to the extent he caused enhanced
injuries. A jury instruction reflecting this comparison of faults
might read as follows: Taking responsibility between the plaintiff
and the manufacturer for the enhanced injuries to be a total of 100
percent, what percentage of the enhanced injury is the result of
plaintiff's failure to take reasonable action to protect himself from
unnecessary harm in the event of a collision?
The suggested instruction uses the phrase "reasonable action
to protect himself from unnecessary harm." The word "reasona-
ble" provides another way to measure the injury-enhancing fault of
40. In Trust Corp. Judge Hatfield addressed the problem of defense terminology and
labeled all conduct (accident-causing and injury-enhancing fault) of the plaintiff that miti-
gates a manufacturer's liability to be comparative fault. Trust Corp. of Montana, 506 F.
Supp. at 1098-99.
41. The argument is as follows: Since the plaintiff's actions were contributory negli-
gence, and the action is in strict liability, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff cannot
be considered to mitigate the defendAnt's strict liability. For a thorough rebuttal of this
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a plaintiff. "Reasonable protection" may require a driver to use a
seat belt. A jury can best make the determination whether a failure
to wear a seat belt is unreasonable. Failure to use a seat belt for a
four block residential drive may be reasonable, whereas it may be
unreasonable on a temporary, two-lane interstate highway. A jury
would evaluate all conduct constituting a plaintiff's injury-enhanc-
ing fault. Examples of a plaintiff's injury-enhancing fault might
include:
(1) failure to lock the car door (injuries suffered because plaintiff
did not remain in the vehicle).4
(2) failure to use a seat belt or shoulder-harness.
4
(3) loading items into the interior of a vehicle in a way that in-
creases the risk of injury in a collision."
If, in applying the suggested instruction, a jury finds a plain-
tiff to be 30 percent at fault for the enhanced injury, the manufac-
turer is liable for the remaining 70 percent of the enhanced injury
damages. In a suit that involves both a vehicle-driving defendant
(negligence action) and a manufacturer (second collision action),
will the plaintiff nevertheless be compensated by the vehicle-driv-
ing defendant for the plaintiff's 30 percent liability for the en-
hanced injuries? In a jurisdiction45 where a vehicle-driving defen-
dant cannot raise the seat-belt defense,'46 the vehicle-driving
42. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978) (on remand jury could consider the effect of plaintiff's failure to lock his door in
comparing the liability of the plaintiff and the manufacturer-defendant).
43. Horn v. General Motors Corp., 34 Cal. App. 3d 773, 110 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1973)
(seat-belt defense available to manufacturer in second collision liability).
44. Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 753, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968), cert.
denied, 225 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969) (luggage placed behind front seat shifted and
struck front seat, causing seat to collapse injuring plaintiffs; the injury-enhancing fault of
the plaintiffs in placing the unsecure luggage in the rear seat was not considered by the trial
court).
45. See, e.g., Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., - Mont. __ , 610 P.2d 668
(1980). Because a vehicle-driving defendant cannot raise the seat-belt defense in Montana, a
plaintiff may choose when his injury-enhancing fault will be considered to reduce his award.
The following two hypothetical situations illustrate this result. Situation 1: Plaintiff's acci-
dent-causing fault is 100 percent and he suffers enhanced injuries. Here, a plaintiff will
certainly argue that accident-causing fault is wholly independent of injury-enhancing fault
so that he may recover for the enhanced injuries. Situation 2: Plaintiff is injured in a colli-
sion where the vehicle-driving defendant has 100 percent accident-causing fault, but the
plaintiff suffers injuries only because he failed to use a seat belt (injury-enhancing fault).
Plaintiff will certainly argue that there is no distinction between the accident-causing fault
of the vehicle-driving defendant and the unnecessarily enhanced injuries of the plaintiff. On
the one hand, a plaintiff argues complete independence of accident-causing fault and injury-
enhancing fault when he is the proximate cause of the first collision. On the other hand,
when a plaintiff is not primarily at accident-causing fault, he will argue for the identity of
accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault.
46. The "seat-belt defense" describes a showing by the defendant that the plaintiff
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defendant will be liable for the plaintiff's 30 percent of the total
enhanced injury. This liability is based on the vehicle-driving de-
fendant's accident-causing fault and is unrelated to second colli-
sion liability. In a jurisdiction where a vehicle-driving defendant
can raise the seat-belt defense,4 a defendant will have the burden
of showing the failure to use a seat belt contributed to a plaintiff's
injuries; the defendant will not be liable for the increased injuries
caused by a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt.48
Use of a seat-belt defense between a plaintiff and a manufac-
turer is justifiable even in a jurisdiction that denies this defense to
defendants in negligence. A manufacturer is entitled to have the
alleged design defect examined in its proper perspective: the total-
ity of the injury-enhancing circumstances, which must include the
safety devices installed by a manufacturer that are designed to re-
duce the risk of injury.
C. Montana's Second Collision Cases Reexamined
The Montana Supreme Court has addressed the defenses
available to a manufacturer in a second collision case only once, in
Oltz v. Toyota Motor Sales.4" Oltz was the driver of the vehicle in
which Brandenburger was riding. The court held in Oltz that as a
matter of law, Oltz's negligence in causing the accident (accident-
causing fault) was a complete bar to his recovery in a second colli-
sion action.50 The suggested analysis of second collision liability
demonstrates that the accident-causing fault of Oltz is irrelevant
as a defense in a second collision action.
Interestingly enough, the Brandenburger opinion does men-
tion a fact in passing that would support a defense based on in-
jury-enhancing fault, but the manufacturer failed to raise it. "The
was not wearing an available seat belt or other restraining device, and that had the device
been worn, the plaintiff would not have sustained injuries as severe as those received,
thereby reducing the defendant's liability. KIMBLE, supra note 3, at § 254.
47. See, e.g., Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966) (failure to use a seat
belt may constitute a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries); Benteler v. Braun,
34 Wis.2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967) (failure to use an available seat belt may mitigate
defendant's liability for damages).
48. The seat-belt defense relieves a vehicle-driving defendant of liability for all inju-
ries that could have been avoided had a seat belt been used; whereas the seat-belt defense
when applied to second collision liability may relieve a manufacturer of liability for part, or
all, of enhanced injuries caused by a defective design. Any vehicle-driving defendant who
raises the second collision liability of a manufacturer as an affirmative defense, in an indi-
rect attempt to take advantage of a manufacturer's right to assert a seat-belt defense, could,
at most, be excused from liability for enhanced injuries.
49. 166 Mont. 217, 531 P.2d 1341 (1975).
50. Id. at 220, 531 P.2d at 1343.
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vehicle was equipped with seat belts, but neither man was wearing
one at the time of the accident."'" Brandenburger and Oltz were
thrown from the vehicle. Both plaintiffs claimed the roof of the
Toyota was defective because it flew off on impact. Brandenburger,
a passenger, recovered damages; Oltz, the negligent driver, did not.
Apparently, the theory of the case was that the roof should have
served as a passive restraining device to keep the occupants within
the vehicle. Toyota did not raise the seat-belt defense, and neither
Toyota nor the plaintiffs presented any direct evidence on the
probable injury that would have resulted had the roof remained on
the vehicle. In fact, Toyota failed to present any expert evidence; it
was content to cross-examine Brandenburger's experts.52
The decision in Trust Corp. considers the pilot's negligence in
causing the crash (accident-causing fault) as part of a comparative
fault defense." This holding is contrary to the analysis of second
collision liability, which demonstrates that the accident-causing
fault of a plaintiff is irrelevant in second collision cases. A com-
parison of accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault con-
tradicts Larsen and the axiom by basing manufacturer liability on
the proximate causation of the first collision and not on the proxi-
mate cause of the enhanced injuries. Because second collision
claims are often brought when a plaintiff's conduct is the proxi-
mate cause of the first collision, the comparison of accident-caus-
ing fault and injury-enhancing fault emasculates second collision
liability.
Trust Corp. cites with approval the adoption of comparative
fault in Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.," a decision by United
States District Judge Murray. A recent national trend, exemplified
in Montana by Zahrte, sanctions the comparison of a plaintiff's
negligence with a manufacturer's strict liability.5 5 Does this prece-
51. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 508-09, 513 P.2d 268, 270
(1973).
52. Id. at 518, 513 P.2d at 275.
53. Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-99 (D.
Mont. 1981).
54. 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980) (adoption of "pure" comparative fault in prod-
uct liability actions).
55. The objection to comparing the contributorily negligent conduct of a plaintiff with
the strict liability of a manufacturer in products liability has often been phrased in terms of
trying to compare "apples" and "oranges." Those courts that have adopted comparative
fault in strict liability have had to deal with this criticism.
The inherent difficulty in the "apples and oranges" argument is its insistence on
fixed and precise definitional treatment of legal concepts . . .[;] furthermore, the
"apples and oranges" argument may be conceptually suspect . . . .Fixed seman-
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dent imply that accident-causing fault should be compared with
injury-enhancing fault? No, there is a clear distinction between the
nature of manufacturer liability in Zahrte and Trust Corp.-
Zahrte is not a second collision case.
In Zahrte, the plaintiff claimed the manufacturer's defective
product was the proximate cause of his injuries; comparison of
Zahrte's conduct with the manufacturing defect was justified be-
cause both parties causally initiated the harm. The distinction be-
tween Zahrte, a typical products liability action for injuries caused
by an alleged defect, and second collision cases is apparent: in sec-
ond collision cases the manufacturing defect, by definition, never
causally initiates the harm, the first collision. This distinction is a
reasonable basis for the courts to allow comparison of "apples" and
"oranges" in the typical products liability action and still refuse to
compare accident-causing fault with injury-enhancing fault in a
second collision action.
Zahrte does, however, contribute to the understanding of com-
parative fault in second collision actions. Comparative fault, as
adopted in Zahrte, compares a plaintiff's accident-causing fault
(negligence) with a manufacturer's accident-causing fault (strict li-
ability). Comparative fault in a second collision case compares a
plaintiff's injury-enhancing fault (negligence) with a manufac-
turer's injury-enhancing fault (strict liability). The comparison of
apples and oranges in Zahrte relates to comparing negligent con-
duct with strict liability as advocated in this comment. Zahrte pro-
vides no support for comparing accident-causing fault with injury-
enhancing fault.
D. Special Verdict Form
It is essential that a manufacturer request a special verdict
form that accurately reflects the unique nature of second collision
liability. The special verdict form should require a jury to examine
each element of a plaintiff's strict liability claim, with special em-
phasis on the requirement that a plaintiff prove the design defect
caused the enhanced injuries, and the extent of a plaintiff's injury-
enhancing fault. The following abbreviated special verdict form
deals only with the second collision aspect of liability and damages.
Liability:
(1) Has the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evi-
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dence (i.e., more likely than not) that there is a practical alterna-
tive to the design of the [alleged defectively designed compo-
nent]? Yes ; No __.
(2) Has the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence (i.e., more likely than not) the probable injuries that would
have been caused by the alternative design had it been used?
Yes _ ; No .51
(3) Has the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence (i.e., more likely than not) the extent of the injuries to the
plaintiff caused by the design of the [alleged defectively designed
component]? Yes _; No. _.__
(4) Were the injuries caused by the design of the [alleged de-
fectively designed component] greater than the injuries that
would probably have been caused had the alternative design been
adopted by the manufacturer? Yes _ ; No 69
(5) [Optional: to be used when the plaintiff died as a result of
his second collision injuries.] Excluding the injuries caused by the
[alleged defectively designed component] and including the prob-
able injuries caused by the alternative design together with all
other actual injuries, were these injuries survivable? Yes -; No
60
(6) Taking the responsibility between the plaintiff and the
manufacturer for the enhanced injuries to be 100%, what per-
centage (%) is the result of the plaintiff's failure to take reasona-
ble action to protect himself from unnecessary harm in the event
of a collision? _ %.611
Damages:
(1) What is the dollar value that will fully compensate the
plaintiff for all his actual harm? $
(2) What would have been the dollar value of all the plain-
tiff's harm if the alternative design suggested by the plaintiff had
been used by the manufacturer? $-.6'
56. See text accompanying note 23 supra. This abbreviated special verdict form omits
the standard direction, "If the answer is 'No' you need go no further."
57. Id.
58. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
59. Id. An affirmative answer establishes that there were enhanced injuries.
60. An affirmative answer would show that the plaintiff failed to prove that the colli-
sion was survivable absent the defective design. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
61. This question requires the jury to determine the comparative fault, or injury-en-
hancing fault, of the plaintiff. See Part IV, § B supra.
62. When the dollar figure in this question is subtracted from a plaintiff's total dollar
damages, the result is the dollar value of the enhanced injuries. Note that to reach the issue
of damages a plaintiff must have proven, when applicable, that the second collision injuries
were survivable but for the defect.
Although this subtraction method can be applied to the calculation of damages, it
would be error to allow a plaintiff to prove enhanced injuries by simply "subtracting" the
1982]
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V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most novel suggestion made in this comment is
that the conduct of a plaintiff in protecting himself from avoidable
harm should be considered in determining a plaintiff's injury-en-
hancing fault. The most important factor in a plaintiff's injury-en-
hancing fault is his failure to use manufacturer-installed safety de-
vices such as a seat belt. Should a plaintiff be responsible in some
measure for his own safety beyond accident avoidance? Recently
the United States government has answered that question in the
affirmative. On October 23, 1981, President Reagan's Secretary of
Transportation announced that proposed government regulations
requiring automobile manufacturers to install passive restraint sys-
tems in all 1983 motor vehicles will be withdrawn. s The announce-
ment emphasized that ours is not a risk free society; part of the
burden to lessen that risk is placed on the individual. The mes-
sage is clear: fasten your seat belt because neither the government
nor the auto manufacturers will do it for you." One might con-
sider this policy a governmental attempt to decentralize life-saving
decision making.
This comment focuses on the distinction between accident-
causing fault and injury-enhancing fault and concludes that the
two faults cannot be compared to determine liability for enhanced
injuries. This conclusion may appear to be too lenient to the plain-
tiff who negligently caused the first collision and then sues for sec-
ond collision enhanced injuries. However, a plaintiff's burden of es-
tablishing a prima facie case is not a light one; he must prove that
the use of an alternative design would have resulted in less injury
than the design used, that the design used was defective by causing
enhanced injuries and that the second collision was survivable but
for a design defect. If a plaintiff can prove his case there is no
windfall for a plaintiff or injustice to a manufacturer because acci-
dent-causing fault cannot be compared with injury-enhancing
fault. Compensation is limited to enhanced injuries, injuries that
probable injuries a plaintiff would have received had the alternative design been used, from
the total actual injuries. To allow a plaintiff to establish his prima facie case without offer-
ing affirmative evidence is unacceptable because it would permit a plaintiff to infer precisely
the claim he must prove: that the presence of a defective design caused his enhanced
injuries.
63. Washington Post, Oct. 24, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
64. A growing number of nations now require automobile drivers to use their seat
belts. These nations include Australia, Canada, France, Israel, Japan, Sweden and in sum-
mer of 1982, Great Britain. CONSUMER REPORTS, Nov. 1981, at 612. Montana requires that
all operating automobiles built after 1966 be equipped with seat belts. MONTANA CODE AN-
NOTATED § 61-9-409 (1981).
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would not have occurred had a proper design been used.
We must admire the courts for creating new causes of action
like second collision liability to compensate those who are unfortu-
nate enough to be harmed by others. Nevertheless, the courts must
support the desirable goal of encouraging members of our society
to be responsible for their own safety. By limiting manufacturer
liability in second collision actions in a principled and fair manner,
and requiring individuals to take affirmative action to guard
against unnecessary injury, the courts will continue to serve the
interests of society.
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